jurisdiction, as it is shown by the fact that both national legislations and international conventions delimit with utmost care the circumstances in which states can extend extraterritorially the jurisdiction of their courts. Such circumstance invites us to think that "their power to claim penal jurisdiction on events occurred abroad is not unlimited". To sum up, since 2009 and in the moment in which the reform subject of this paper was processed, Spain was able to exercise its jurisdiction solely and exclusively over events or situations that had some relation with our country -because after the said reform, the mere fact that serious violations of the human rights occurred against helpless human beings was no longer a matter of our interest or, better, of our business-, and provided that no other court, either national or international, it was the same, had already initiated a proceeding that may mean a research and an effective pursue, as it has just been pointed out. In other words, a principle of universal justice of subsidiary application. Being this the actual situation of our system at the beginning of 2014, does anybody truly believe that international law demanded the express reform approved by our Parliament? Does anybody truly believe that the principle thus formulated violated International Law? Obviously, it might have been an annoying and unconformable principle… but that is another thing. Cf. section III titled "Los asuntos chinos, las presiones de Pequín y el procedimiento parlamentario", from Sánchez Legido's paper, which, in my opinion, synthesizes perfectly if not the only reason that led to the reform, at least the last straw that broke the camel's back that for many was already almost broken, A. Sánchez Legido, "El fin del modelo español de What is the basis to make such statement? The clear agreement existing in international society regarding the need to end the impunity of some criminal behaviours, and particularly those I am referring to. It is shown by the fact that the International Community, through the UN Security Council, created two International jurisdicción universal", 27 REEI (2014), at 5-8, text available at http://www.reei.org/index.php/revista/num27/articulos/finmodelo-espanol-jurisdiccion-universal (accessed 4 September 2014). 9 Cf. Resolution passed by the Institute of International Law in 2005 affirming that "universal jurisdiction is primarily based on customary international law". However, it would be interesting to know to which principle of universal justice does it refer, or in other words, under which conditions it can be applied (available at http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf, accessed 4 September 2014).
Criminal Courts -for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda-and with other specificities, the Special Court for Sierra Leona, and, of course, it must also be mentioned, the permanent International Criminal Court has been created for them. In spite of all its limitations, this permanent court unites 122 states around its creating statute. Some may answer to this remark that international courts and national courts are different things and, of course, I am aware of it. However the deep conviction existing in the international society of the need to cooperate to end impunity precisely in those cases cannot be denied. And a way to cooperate to stop impunity is to increase the range of possibilities to exercise jurisdiction. Besides, it is not correct to argue that given the existence of an ICC there is no point in applying the principle of universal justice to such offenses, because we all know that the ICC has a complementary jurisdiction -the responsibility to stop impunity still belongs to the states-, temporarily limited-events prior to July 2002 are automatically out of its range-, and, apart from exceptional cases -situation referred by the Security Council-its jurisdiction depends on its being part of the treaty, the territorial state or the state of the perpetrator's nationality.
Therefore, in my opinion, the reform carried out in March 2014 was not at all a compulsory reform because I do not think that the formulation of the universal justice principle in force until then in our system -it should be remembered that it was a principle applied at a subsidiary level and provided that there was some connection point with our country-represented an interference in the national affairs of third states or an attack to their sovereignty. Finally, I do not think either that it constituted an infringement of any provision of the international legal order.
DOES THE REFORM APPROVED BY THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT IN MARCH 2014 CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF ONE OR SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS?
Defending that the reform was not an obligation is different from affirming, without any other precision, that it violates International Law, meaning that by approving the reform Spain ceases to meet the international obligations validly accepted, regardless of their kind. To reach that conclusion we must spin the fine details, and specify in which cases Spain could incur in international liability and why, above all taking into consideration how case-based is this current Article 23(4) of the LOPJ, because it includes no more and no less than 16 sections -letters a) to p)-referring to an even greater number of behaviours regulated by different international instruments, many of them conventional, but also of another nature, with different application conditions in each case.
Given the extension I have in this paper, I shall only focus on the existing situation in relation to some of the behaviours appearing in Article 23(4), and the most interesting and polemic ones from a practical and media point of view, because they are authentic international crimes, especially in need In my opinion States are obliged to search for the alleged war criminals inside their sovereign borders, not beyond, because otherwise there would be an overlap of obligations between all the States member of the Geneva Conventions without much sense. Therefore, the search obligation would be limited to their own territory, although the States would have the power to search beyond. Cf. The defence of the obligation to search in any part of the world in M. Abad Castelos. "La persecución restringida de los delitos que lesionan valores esenciales de la Comunidad Internacional: ¿sigue existiendo la jurisdicción universal en España?", 15 Revista de Filosofía, Derecho y Política (January 2012) 65-90, at 74, available at http://earchivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/13385/abad_RU_2012.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 4 September 2014); I. Blanco Cordero, "La jurisdicción universal en España: un paso en la lucha contra la impunidad", in A.I. Pérez Cepeda (Dir.), El principio de justicia universal: fundamentos y límites (Tirant Monografías 813, Valencia, 2012) 559, at 582-583. 12 Cf. paragraph 7th of the comments to Art. 9 in Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-eight session (6 May-26 July 1996) , Yearbook of International Law Commission 1996, Volume II-Part Two, at. 35. Geneva Conventions, unless such gap could be covered using the provision of section p) of Article 23(4) LOPJ, or unless it is deemed that the conventional provisions mentioned are self-executive and, therefore, an adequate basis for the Spanish judges to apply the principle of universal justice as it is provided in the treaties.
In fact, section p) of Article 23(4) LOPJ works as a hotchpotch, because it establishes that also Spanish courts shall have jurisdiction over "any other crime whose pursue may be imposed compulsorily by a Treaty in force for Spain or by other ruling instruments of an International Organisation to which Spain may belong, in the circumstances and the conditions determined thereby". We could interpret that the section we have just transcribed can cover the international obligations, both conventional and institutional -it does not mention customary obligations-that are not considered in the previous sections of Article 23.4 of LOPJ. In that regard, we could refer to section p) to cover the circumstance of the presence in Spain of an alleged war criminal whose extradition has not been requested by any state. In that event, in accordance with Article 23.4, section a), we could not exercise our jurisdiction, because the extradition would not have been refused by us, but we would have jurisdiction in accordance with section p), in relation to Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the I, II, III and IV Convention respectively, as well as Article 85 of Additional Protocol I. If this interpretation is not admitted -understanding that the reference to "any other offence" appearing at the beginning of section p) would indicate an offence different from the ones mentioned in the previous sections, therefore, also different from war crimes-, we consider that the self executing nature of the said articles could be defended. As a result our national Spanish judge could refer to them directly with the purpose of substantiating his jurisdiction over those offences and avoiding Spain's failure to fulfil its international obligations. we cannot affirm either that the legislator has violated any conventional obligation due to the subjection of the principle of universal justice to limits or conditions when it is applied to genocide.
And I think that we must draw the same conclusion regarding the crimes against humanity given that we lack a conventional instrument to define it autonomously, and, as a result, to establish some specific conditions to exercise the extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard to the same. It would be a different matter if the Spanish legislator was violating not just a conventional obligation but a customary obligation. Does current Article 23(4)(a) violate any customary international obligation in relation to crimes against humanity and genocide? It is not easy to answer affirmatively to that question, if we apply strictly the definition of customary rule, i.e., general, constant, uniform and lasting practice carried out with the conviction of acting in compliance with an international obligation. The IDI in the resolution approved in Krakow in 2005, of which C. Tomuschat was rapporteur, stated that the principle of universal justice "est fondée en premier lieu sur le droit international coutumier". 14 But, which are the specific profiles, i.e. the conditions to apply the principle of universal justice accepted by all, not as a power but as an obligation for the states? We insist that this is difficult to determine outright. If we remember, the Article 8 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Safety of Mankind passed by the ILC in 1996 stated the obligation of the states to adopt necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction over the international crimes to which we are referring constantly, "wherever they were committed and whoever their perpetrators were", but it does not specify anything else regarding the application conditions. Nevertheless, Sánchez Legido is right when he points out that "it is difficult to deny that in the international practice there are enough elements to affirm the existence of an opinion iuris generalis" 15 in favour of applying the principle aut dedere aut judicare to the analysed crimes. For instance, we could mention the above mentioned provision of points out that the Convention's silence on genocide must not be understood as a prohibition. However it is contradictory with the treaty's purpose understanding that the States member of the Convention would have waived a pursuit mechanism that could be used by non members, above all taking into account the long lasting inexistence of an International Criminal Court and the usual inefficiency of the territorial state's courts in these cases. 14 Cf. Section two. In section three of the resolution, the Institute of International Law (IIL) pointed out: a) that universal jurisdiction is applied to international crimes such as genocide, crimes against mankind, serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in times of war conflict, either national or international; b) leaving aside the research proceedings and the extradition requests, the requirement of the presence of the alleged perpetrator in the State's territory that intends to exercise the jurisdiction; c) the implicit recognition of the subsidiary nature of the principle since it establishes the need to suggest the States with any connection with the events, that they should be the ones exercising the jurisdiction, i.e. territorial state, state of the perpetrator's nationality, provided that they have the will and capability to carry out his or her trial; d) and in relation to the above statements, the consideration on the side of the State intending to exercise the universal jurisdiction of the possibility to grant extradition to the State with some connection with the events and that has requested it. Cf. Resolution adopted on the 26th August 2005, supra n. 9. In a similar way, the International Association of Penal Law (IAPL) approved another resolution connected to the universal justice principle in the meeting held in Istanbul between 20-27 September 2009, coinciding in some points with the main points of the IIL: acceptance of "research actions" in revelry (submission of criminal proceedings, research, evidence assurance, accusation or extradition requests), but not the process itself when the basis of the jurisdiction is the principle of universal justice (section III of the Resolution). Cf. Text of the Resolution in <http://www.penal.org/IMG/pdf/NEP_23_esp.pdf>, at. 247 (accessed 3 September 2014). 15 Cf. the arguments set forth by Sánchez Legido in "El fin del modelo español de jurisdicción universal", supra n. 8, at 37-38. article 9 of the Draft of the ILC. It recognised that the principle aut dedere aut judicare is also applied to crimes against humanity and genocide, as well as to some infractions of the Geneva Conventions different from the serious ones, implying that, the state in whose territory there is a person allegedly responsible of such behaviours, either he is submitted to trial or extradited if it has been requested, but the obligation to a trial still exists if the last option does not take place -the obligation does not appear when the extradition is denied but due to the mere presence of the alleged offender in the state's territory. This being said is it possible to cover such customary obligation, to some extent, in view of the current writing of the Art. 23(4)(a) of the LOPJ? In my opinion, now it is more difficult to give a positive answer because section p) -which served us as a possible resource to fill the void in the case of war crimes-refers to the obligations derived from conventional and institutional rules, but not to the ones derived from customary law, which, in this case, are equally self executing in so far as we are referring to a procedure rule that assigns the jurisdiction.
HAS IT BEEN A CONVENIENT OR AN UNAVOIDABLE REFORM DUE TO NON-LEGAL REASONS?
After all that has been set forth throughout these pages, my obvious conclusion is that, from a strictly legal point of view, the reform could have been avoided. But, was it a convenient reform? It all depends on the point of view from which that convenience is analysed. If we are talking about convenience regarding the stability of diplomatic and economic relations with third states, especially with the greatest powers, the answer is yes, the reform was convenient. Because, as I am aware, answering no with the deep crisis the country is undergoing is not politically correct, and it might be quite a naïve answer. However, if we are talking about convenience in other terms, terms of respect for the human rights, justice and fighting against impunity, and even about peace, the answer to the question would be, in my opinion, a categorical no. And that is the position I am taking because I consider that, if we believe it, it is necessary to keep defending, even from the University, the legal arguments and of other nature that exist to defend the principle of universal justice, at least in its Maybe before the victims' expectations were not fully satisfied, but they will be even less fulfilled if the doors are deliberately closed for third states to exercise jurisdiction, knowing as we do, we are well aware of that, the scarce success of processes in the headquarters of the territorial state.
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In this regard, we must remember how satisfactory it was for many victims, and for the defenders of the human rights in general, the background, the lesson and the advances in the fight against impunity that meant a process such as the Dictator Augusto Pinochet's, although the case was filed once the British authorities decided not to extradite him to our country.
It is true that the states that had led the cause of the human rights protection allowing their courts to exercise their jurisdiction extraterritorially, have decided to retreat from that front line.
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It is not because international law requests it, but because they want to protect themselves from the damages that such position implies. However, that is not a legal requirement but another thing. 
